Precolonial institutions and deforestation in Africa by Larcom, Shaun et al.
1 
Precolonial Institutions and Deforestation in Africa 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
Precolonial Institutions and Deforestation in Africa 
 
Abstract: 
We find that local institutions inherited from the precolonial era continue to play an important 
role in natural resource governance in Africa.  Using satellite image data, we find a significant 
and robust relationship between deforestation and precolonial succession rules of local leaders 
(local chiefs).  In particular, we find that those precolonial areas where local leaders were 
appointed by ‘social standing’ have higher rates of deforestation compared to the base case of 
hereditary rule and where local leaders were appointed from above (by paramount chiefs).  
While the transmission mechanisms behind these results are complex, we suggest that areas 
where local leaders were appointed by social standing are more likely to have poorer institutions 
governing local leadership and forest management. 
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1. Introduction 
According to the United Nations Millennium Development Goals Report (2013) close to 75 per 
cent of the world’s forests are now protected by national governments. However, despite the 
large increase in protected forests in recent decades, deforestation remains a significant problem 
in much of the developing world.  According to the same report, around 3.4 million hectares of 
net forest were lost per year in Africa for the period 2005 to 2010.  The report (2013:42) 
concludes that ‘[f]orests are disappearing at a rapid pace, despite the establishment of forest 
policies and laws supporting sustainable forest management in many countries.’ 
One reason for continued high rates of deforestation despite a significant increase in state 
protections is illegal deforestation.  Using a model of competitive rent seeking and data from 
Indonesia, Burgess et al. (2012), provide evidence that a key determinant of deforestation is a 
lack of enforcement of state protections due to corruption among local politicians and 
bureaucrats.  More recently, Alesina, et. al. (2014) have found that deforestation is correlated 
with the degree of ethnic fractionalization found within local communities. Conceiving forests as 
community public goods, they conclude that more ethically fractionalized societies are less able 
to coordinate and organize resistance against the consequences of poor state institutions, corrupt 
politicians and illegal logging. 
We contribute to this literature that looks beneath the surface of state regulation by investigating 
the role that precolonial institutions play in relation to deforestation.  Despite over 95 per cent of 
African forests falling under public ownership and approximately 80 per cent being managed by 
the state (FAO, 2010:10), we hypothesize that the remnants of precolonial institutions continue 
to play an important role in forest management and rates of deforestation.  Specifically, we 
examine the relationship between the succession rules of village heads (local chiefs) and current 
rates of deforestation in Africa.  We undertake this analysis using deforestation data obtained 
from satellite images within 645 boundaries of precolonial societies and within the boundaries of 
49 states in Africa.  In doing so, we control for known and likely drivers of deforestation; 
including protected areas, population density, a range of geographic characteristics (including 
elevation and vegetation regions), economic variables (including light density at night), 
institutional variables (including rule of law and form of colonial rule), and country fixed effects. 
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This paper is motivated by a growing literature that highlights the enduring importance of 
precolonial institutions on a range of current outcomes in Africa: Gennaioli and Rainer (2007), 
Ziltener and Mueller (2007), Fenske (2013, 2014), Larcom (2013), and Michalopoulos and 
Papaioannou (2013, 2014), and have all found a strong statistical relationship between measures 
of precolonial institutions and current measures of institutional quality.  While there are different 
explanations put forward for these results, they all are grounded on the premise that states are 
relatively weak across much of Africa, especially in rural areas, and that this creates demand for 
non-state regulation.  On this, Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2013:115) conclude that the 
‘inability of African states to provide public goods and broadcast power beyond the capitals led 
African citizens to continue relying on the local ethnic-specific structures rather than the national 
Government’.  Acemoglu et al. (2014:362) reach a similar conclusion regarding the capacity of 
the state in Africa, finding that the ‘majority of the population lives in rural areas and where the 
national state often lacks capacity and the power to “penetrate" society’.   
While precolonial institutions may persist in many parts of Africa, it is another matter linking 
them to natural resource management, and deforestation in particular. However, there are good 
reasons to do so.  In a comparative study of land tenure systems across the continent, Otsuka and 
Place (2001) conclude that primary forests and uncultivated woodlands are still largely governed 
by communal ownership regimes with control rights vested with local chiefs or other traditional 
local authorities.  They also conclude that the continuation of these types of governance regimes 
differs from much of Africa’s farm land, where individual ownership rights are much more 
common.  Ensminger (1997) also concluded that communal ownership of forest resources spans 
across much of Africa.  The link between resource management and traditional institutions is 
also supported by recent large-scale survey data from AFRObarometer that confirms the 
continued importance of indigenous institutions in rural Africa, especially in relation to dispute 
resolution and use of land (Logan 2013).
1
  
In an investigation of deforestation in the South Nandi and Karura Forests of Kenya, Klopp 
(2012) found that forests are often incorporated into the patronage networks of elites and 
resources are distributed in return for political support.   Brown and Makana (2014:3) also found 
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 See also Thondhlana et al. (2015) and Osei-Tutu et al. (2014) who document traditional local institutions and local 
leaders continuing  to play a role in natural resource governance in contemporary Africa (along with state and other-
non state institutions). 
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that much of the deforestation in the northeast of the Democratic Republic of Congo was 
generated by small-scale loggers who paid ‘traditional chiefs’ for logging permits.  However, 
they found that the permits often had no legal status from the national government and that the 
funds received were appropriated by the chiefs themselves with little benefit to the local 
community.  They also found that some loggers who wished to secure access to forests for 
logging provided local chiefs with gifts, such as motorcycles. It is suggested here that the 
different institutional structures that govern natural resources should be related to the rate of 
deforestation due to the importance of institutional checks and balances on the performance of 
local leaders.  Acemoglu et al. (2014) have recently found that chiefs with fewer checks and 
balances on their power produce worse economic development outcomes for their people, 
primarily through their ability to engage in self-interested behaviour that is made possible 
through their control of land and natural resources.   
In terms of village chiefs, institutional checks and balances can come from above (e.g. 
paramount chiefs) or from below (e.g. democratic accountability). We can expect that the checks 
and balances on those who are vested with control rights over land and natural resources will 
directly influence the rate of deforestation.  Where less checks and balances are in place, the 
pursuit of self-interested forest management practices is more possible and this can lead to 
increased logging and deforestation.  Conversely, where local leadership is checked, we could 
expect the remnants of precolonial institutions to guard against corrupt officials and predatory 
logging companies.  In addition, different sources of local authority may generate more conflict 
and uncertainty over the use rights of natural resources than others.  For instance, Filer (2012) 
and Larcom (2015) have documented how highly dispersed local customary institutions in Papua 
New Guinea can lead to both internal and external conflict over forest resources.  This conflict 
can lead to uncertainty over ownership that can devalue the natural resource and encourage those 
who have access to it to exploit it faster than they otherwise would like.  Different sources of 
local authority may also lead to variations in the costs associated with co-ordination against 
outsiders wishing to exploit their resources and therefore lead to different levels of deforestation.   
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2. Materials and Methods 
Our empirical method focuses on estimating the relationship between the succession rules for 
village heads with deforestation data from 2000-2012 obtained from satellite data within 645 
boundaries of precolonial societies and within the boundaries of 49 states in Africa.  Due to the 
potential for omitted variable bias we control for all known and likely drivers of deforestation 
(see Barbier and Burgess (2001), Burgess et al. (2012), Geist and Lambin 2002 and DeFries et 
al. 2010) including, protected areas, population density, a range of geographic characteristics 
(including elevation and vegetation regions), economic variables (including light density at 
night), institutional variables (including rule of law and form of colonial rule) and country fixed 
effects. 
Specifically, we estimate the relationship between local precolonial institutions and recent rates 
of deforestation by estimating variants of the following model:  
                
           (1) 
where,       is the rate of forest change for the period 2000-2012 in each precolonial society i in 
country c.     represents our precolonial institutional measures,      is a vector of control 
variables that consist of the broad headings of current institutions, colonial institutions, 
population density, geographical, economic development and forest stock controls, and    are 
country fixed effects. To account for the possibility of spatial correlation we use double clustered 
standard errors at the ethnic-family level and country level (Cameron et al. 2011, Michalopoulos 
and Papaioannou 2013, 2014).  Where possible, we include country fixed effects to account for 
time invariant differences that are country specific.  
While we acknowledge the potential for endogeneity inherent in the use of institutions as 
predictors, we consider that this is mitigated by the fact that our measures are indeed precolonial 
and that we control for a wide variety of (largely immutable) geographic characteristics.  Finally, 
while there have been large migrations and forced displacements within Africa, Nunn and 
Wantchekon (2011) have found a strong correlation (0.55) between the current location of 
residents and their historical ethnic homelands as identified by Murdock (1967).  Due to the 
unavailability of data we do not explicitly include a measure for ethnic fractionalization at the 
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precolonial level, however we do include a number of geographic variables that are known 
drivers of ethnic fractionalisation (see Michalopoulos 2012) and use country fixed effects that 
should capture any variance in ethnic fractionalization at the country level.  
 Data 
2.1.1 Spatial data on deforestation 
The main measure of deforestation is sourced from Hansen et al. (2013).  It represents the 
percentage of net forest loss within the boundaries of each precolonial society from 2000 to 
2012; where net forest loss is the difference between loss and gain of forest cover.  As can be 
seen from Table 1, over this period mean deforestation is 1.090 per cent with a standard 
deviation of 1.491 per cent. The largest amount of deforestation of any area was 15.515 per cent, 
while the largest net gain was 0.964 per cent. Figure 1 illustrates the degree of deforestation in 
each precolonial society between 2000 and 2012. Most deforestation occurred within the tropics, 
predominantly in West Africa and, to a lesser extent, in the Congo basin and the south east of the 
continent (Mozambique and Tanzania).  When focusing on the designated forested regions of 
Africa only, it can also be seen from Table 1 that deforestation is higher over the sample period; 
at 1.607 per cent compared to 1.090 per cent for the continent as a whole.   
Figure 1: Deforestation within precolonial and national boundaries 
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Figure 2: Precolonial boundaries of Africa 
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2.1.2 Precolonial Institutions 
We use quantitative ethnographic data from Murdoch’s (1967) Ethnographic Atlas to measure 
local precolonial institutions under the following succession rules: hereditary appointment, 
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democratically appointment, appointed from above, or appointed by social standing.  Murdock 
sourced his data from descriptions from anthropologists during the late 19
th
 Century and first half 
of the 20
th
 Century.  As can be seen from Table 1, the majority of local village heads in Africa 
were appointed on hereditary grounds, and hereditary succession is therefore used as the base 
case for our econometric analysis.  As can be seen from Figure 2, the geographic distribution of 
different local village head succession rules does not present clear patterns. While the hereditary 
rule predominates, democratic rule is found in the Atlantic side of Maghreb, the Horn of Africa, 
and the lower Nile basin; and ‘social standing’ and ‘from above’ appear to have a largely random 
distribution.   
It can also be seen from Figure 2 that precolonial societies vary in size considerably.  The mean 
area of a precolonial society is approximately 26,000 square kilometres (roughly the same size of 
the island of Sicily); while the smallest is 110 square kilometres and the largest is 494,000 square 
kilometres (with a standard deviation of 47,000 square kilometres).  Given that many societies 
are spread across different countries, consistent with the methodology of Michalopoulos and 
Papaioannou (2013), we intersect Murdock’s digitised ethnolinguistic map with the 2000 Digital 
Chart of the World to identify partitioned ethnicities and assign each ethnic area to a specific 
country.  This sees 191 precolonial institutions split into 2 or more countries in our sample.
2
  In 
terms of precolonial societies per country, the mean is 13.86 (with a standard deviation of 14.27).  
Nigeria has the highest number of precolonial societies within its borders (with 61), while 
Swaziland has only 1.  In terms of within country variation of succession rules, the mean is 3.06 
succession rules per country (with a standard deviation of 0.92), with 3 countries recording the 
minimum of 1 and 19 countries recording the maximum of 4.      
Given that the literature highlights the importance of local leadership for forest management in 
Africa, we focus our analysis on local precolonial institutions.  However, given that political 
centralization (or jurisdictional hierarchy) has been shown to be an important variable for a 
number of other studies linking precolonial institutions to current institutional outcomes, we 
include a measure of political centralization in our estimations; where a value of 0 represents a 
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 The mean number of countries that precolonial institutions were split into was 1.549 with a standard deviation of 
0.727, minimum of 1 and maximum of 6. 
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politically fragmented society and a value of 1 represents a politically centralized society (see 
Gennaioli and Rainer 2007).     
2.1.3 Colonial Institutions 
Given the potential role that colonial institutions may play, we use Ziltener and Kunzler’s (2013) 
data on the duration of colonial rule and the form of colonial rule. The form of colonial rule 
measures different levels of colonial rule: no colonial domination, semi-colonialism, indirect rule 
with minimal interference in internal affairs, indirect rule with significant interference in internal 
affairs, and direct rule. As our dataset did not include any states characterized by no colonial 
domination or semi-colonialism, we only included the two categories of indirect rule and direct 
rule. Indirect rule is characterized by the colonial power having: claimed exclusive rights over 
the colonized society’s foreign relations, defended (or likely to have defended) the society from 
third countries, deployed an actor to influence and check the decisions made by the indigenous 
leader, and held direct control over some administrative structures.  Societies classified as having 
been under direct rule are defined as societies where the traditional political system was replaced 
with a new political structure (see further details in Table S1 in Appendix).  
We also use an intensity of colonization measure that is the sum of the logarithms of the duration 
of colonial rule and the form of political domination (indirect or direct rule), and a binary 
measure of legal origin, where 0 represents countries with British legal origins and 1 represents 
countries with French legal origins (La Porta et al. 2001).  
2.1.4 Current Institutions 
Current institutions are measured by the rule of law and protected areas. We use the World 
Bank’s rule of law index, which aims to measure the quality of state institutions, ‘in particular 
the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the 
likelihood of crime and violence’ (Kaufmann et al. 2008). The index is normalized and runs 
from -2.5 to 2.5 with higher values indicating better rule of law. In our sample, we find a mean 
value of -0.861 with a standard deviation of 0.553 and a minimum of -1.912.  Protected areas 
refers to the percentage of area within a precolonial society that is protected and which was 
declared as such on or before 2003. Our operational definition of protected areas is broad and 
includes protected forests governed both by the state and non-state actors. To construct our 
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measure of protected forests we used the Protected Planet dataset (IUCN and UNEP-WCMC, 
2013). The dataset includes all areas with designated protection and this includes the range of 
IUCN protection categories (I to VI), as well as areas outside of the IUCN scale. This global 
database is the most complete to date.  However, due to visibly inaccurate spatial data, we 
eliminated UNESCO Biosphere Reserves and replaced Ramsar areas with official data (Ramsar 
2013). We also excluded protected areas labelled as marine reserves and whose status was 
'proposed' or 'not reported'.  In order to merge overlapping protected areas we dissolved all areas 
into a single multi-part polygon. The resulting data layer thus classifies the continent into 
protected and not-protected. We then calculated the percentage of area protected within each 
precolonial society. In our sample, the mean ratio of protected area to the total land area was 
12.333 per cent with a standard deviation of 18.304 per cent.    
Table 1: Summary statistics 
Variable N N = 
1 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Deforestation 683 - 1.090 1.491 -0.964 15.515 
Deforestation (forests only) 282 - 1.607 1.522 -0.421 8.087 
Deforestation (alternative measure) 683 - 1.694 23.698 -71.606 75.105 
Deforestation (alternative measure, forests 
only) 
281 - 7.034 23.796 -71.606 74.378 
Rule of law 683 - -0.861 0.553 -1.912 0.708 
Protected areas 683 - 12.333 18.304 0 100 
Colonial duration 668 - 110.967 79.878 15 469 
Indirect rule  668 457 0.684 0.465 0 1 
Colonial intensity 668 - 5.015 0.697 2.708 6.700 
Legal origins 680 376 0.553 0.498 0 1 
Political centralization 683 243 0.356 0.479 0 1 
Chief succession (hereditary) 645 531 0.823 0.382 0 1 
Chief succession (democratic) 645 50 0.078 0.268 0 1 
Chief succession (from above) 645 38 0.059 0.236 0 1 
Chief succession (social standing) 645 26 0.040 0.197 0 1 
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2.1.5 Control variables 
We compiled a number of control variables that are known or likely to be related to deforestation 
(see details Table S1 in Appendix).
3
   We grouped these controls into four categories: population 
density, geographic controls (including elevation, longitude and latitude), economic development 
controls (light density) and forest stock controls. Summary statistics for our control variables can 
be found in the Appendix (Table S4). The data on vegetation is based on terrestrial ecoregions of 
the world from WWF (Olson et al. 2001; see Figure 3). We grouped the 126 categories of 
ecoregions from this database that are present in Africa in nine major categories: forest, 
woodland, grassland, desert, mangrove, savannah, bushland (which includes thicket, moorland, 
scrubland), miombo, and other low vegetation or unique ecosystems (which includes fynbos, 
Karoo, steppe, halophytic).
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Figure 3: Vegetation zones of Africa 
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 We also calculated correlation coefficients between the key variables and controls (Tables S2 and S3 in the 
Appendix).  It can be seen that none of the variables are highly correlated with one another. 
4
 For each precolonial institution, we calculated the fraction of the area covered by each ecoregion using Africa 
Albers Equal projection. We used these fractions to determine the predominant ecoregion in each precolonial 
institution. 
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3. Theory 
Our empirical analysis is based on the hypothesis that precolonial institutions continue to impact 
on natural resource management in Africa.  From the introduction, it is known that precolonial 
institutions closely relate to current measures of economic activity and that local village leaders 
often continue to control access to land and forest resources under the continued and widespread 
use of communal forest institutions across Africa.  Therefore, if precolonial institutions continue 
to play a meaningful role in forest protection and exploitation, we content that different forms of 
precolonial institutions should be related to current rates of deforestation.   
While an explanation has been provided for why we can expect precolonial institutions to persist 
to current times and play an important role in forest management, it does not explain why the 
different succession rules of village heads chiefs should be related to current rates of 
deforestation.  We suggest that there are two potential transmission mechanisms.  The first is that 
the succession rules provide a proxy for institutional checks and balances on local village heads 
that may see some more prone to engage in deforestation than others.  The second is that the 
succession rules provide a proxy for property rights uncertainty and internal conflict that may 
generate higher or lower levels of deforestation.  As will be evident from the discussion below, 
neither mechanism is mutually exclusive. 
Consistent with the findings of Acemoglu et al. (2014) we hypothesize that local village leaders 
with fewer institutional checks on their power are more prone to exploit (or fail to protect) local 
forests, which according to Alesina et al. (2014) have community public good attributes. The 
precolonial succession rules for local village heads fall under the following four categories: 
hereditary, democratic, from above, and social standing (discussed in more detail below).  We 
use these succession rules as a proxy for contemporary institutional checks on village heads.  
Specifically, compared to the base case of hereditary succession we consider that village chiefs 
who were elected by ‘social standing’ to be the most unaccountable and lacking the most 
authority, and therefore prone to exploitative practices.  We hypothesise that this form of 
succession is the most prone to strategic manipulation and patrimonial practices.  Patrimonial 
practices require rents for distribution in exchange for political support, and forest exploitation is 
an important source of such rents (see Richards 1998).  We hypothesise that village chiefs who 
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were ‘elected from above’ should be more institutionally checked than the base case of 
hereditary succession, and therefore manage the forest resources in a more sustainable manner.  
This is so as chiefs appointed from above face the risk of dismissal from a paramount chief (from 
above) for poor or corrupt performance.  Indeed, it is the view of Herbst (2000) that local chiefs 
were more accountable where they faced oversight from above.   
We consider that chiefs who were ‘democratically elected’ to be the intermediate case in terms 
of their relationship with deforestation; situated between those appointed through social standing 
and those appointed from above.  On the one hand democratically elected chiefs face an 
important institutional check in the form of the risk of electoral loss for poor performance or 
corrupt behaviour; however they may also be prone to engage in patrimonial practices to gain or 
remain in power.  On this point, Klopp (2012) argues that more political competition can require 
greater resources to secure tenure (in terms of campaign funds and distributing largesse in return 
for support) and those in power exploit forest resources while they can (knowing that they may 
lose tenure in the next election).  Furthermore, democratically elected chiefs may be more 
willing to act on the preferences of their constituents who may prefer to trade-off short term 
consumption for long-term welfare, as identified by Nordhaus (1975).  
The other potential mechanism underlying the link between village head succession rules and 
deforestation is that different sources of authority among village heads may generate more 
uncertainty and conflict over natural resource use rights.  Consistent with the findings of Filer 
(2012) and Larcom (2015) we also hypothesize that where local leaders have less concrete 
sources of authority, there will be more conflict and uncertainty over property rights that can 
devalue forest resources and make co-ordination against outsiders wishing to exploit their 
resources more difficult.     
A useful way to consider forest governance in Africa (and much of the developing world) is 
through the concept of legal pluralism. It implies that multiple institutional regimes can coexist 
in the same place and can enforce their own rules on the same people and resources (Griffiths 
1986).  In a legally pluralistic environment, where there may be multiple ownership rights issued 
over the same natural resource, uncertainty can be generated both within the local group and 
between the local group and other groups or actors.  In terms of ownership disputes within a 
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local group, multiple families or individuals within the same community may lay claim to the 
same piece of land (and trees).  In terms of ownership disputes between groups or actors, this can 
occur when state ownership rights conflict with customary ownership rights. This is especially 
the case when local resource owners have not been adequately compensated for the transfer of 
their traditional resources to the state or some other entity, or when ownership rights over natural 
resources are deemed to be inalienable by their customary owners (even if they were previously 
‘sold’ in the past).  This conflict can lead to uncertainty over ownership, to devaluation of the 
natural resource among all those who claim it, and to encourage those who have access to exploit 
it when they have the chance. Disputed ownership may also increase co-ordination costs and 
reduce the incentives to protect forests from outsiders who wish to exploit forests for timber, 
whether they are logging companies or corrupt state officials (Alesina et al. 2014).  Such a 
hypothesis is also consistent with the findings of Deacon (1996), who considers that instability 
and conflict leads to less secure land tenure; seeing users more willing to exploit forest resources 
and less willing to take long term investments.  In terms of succession rules, we can expect some 
to be more likely to generate uncertainty over ownership rights than others.  Compared to the 
base case of hereditary appointment, those village chiefs appointed from above should have more 
legitimacy than those appointed by social status, which almost by definition involves the 
distribution of patrimonial largesse.  Furthermore, we can expect those appointed from above can 
call upon, and draw upon the authority of paramount chiefs, when ownership disputes arise.   
4. Results 
Table 2 presents the least squares estimates for precolonial institutions and deforestation in 
Africa.  Compared to the base case of hereditary succession, the coefficient for precolonial 
societies where village heads were appointed from above (usually by paramount chiefs) is 
positive and significant across most specifications.  As can be seen from Column 1, the 
coefficient is negative with a value of -0.627 and significant at the 1 per cent level with the 
absence of any controls.  However, as can be seen from Columns 2 to 6, when the controls are 
added the coefficient falls in value by almost two thirds.  Our preferred specification includes 
country fixed effects and with all the controls at the precolonial level, and can be found in 
Column 6.  It can also be seen that this specification has a much higher R-squared than the other 
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specifications; 0.406, indicating goodness of fit.  In Column 6, it can be seen that the coefficient 
for appointment from above is -0.297 and significant at the 5 per cent level.  This indicates that 
the regions where local leaders were appointed from above in precolonial times have 
approximately 0.297 percentage points increase in forest cover (compared to the base case of 
hereditary succession) over the period 2000 to 2012.  Given that mean deforestation across all 
regions was 1.090 per cent for the same period, this suggests that the magnitude of this 
relationship between the appointment from above and deforestation is substantial.  The 
coefficients of the two other modes of appointment (democratic and social standing) are positive 
(indicating higher levels of deforestation compared to the basecase of hereditary succession) but 
not statistically significant.  It can also be seen that the coefficient for the degree of precolonial 
political centralization is statistically insignificant, and approximating zero for our preferred 
specification.     
Table 2: Precolonial institutions and deforestation in Africa 
       
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Local precolonial institutions       
Democratic election -0.197 0.086 0.083 0.079 0.083 0.246 
 (0.250) (0.184) (0.182) (0.169) (0.168) (0.169) 
Election from above -0.627*** -0.207 -0.227* -0.247* -0.248* -0.297** 
 (0.214) (0.126) (0.135) (0.137) (0.137) (0.119) 
Election by social standing -0.135 -0.016 -0.007 -0.035 -0.017 0.006 
 (0.305) (0.260) (0.262) (0.273) (0.271) (0.270) 
 
Political centralization 
   
0.043 
 
0.041 
 
0.031 
 
-0.001 
   (0.153) (0.146) (0.145) (0.125) 
 
R^2 
 
0.011 
 
0.248 
 
0.248 
 
0.245 
 
0.246 
 
0.406 
Colonial institutions No No No Yes Yes No 
Current institutions No No No No Yes Yes 
Population density No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Geographic controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Economic development controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Forest stock control No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects No No No No No Yes 
Observations 645 645 645 632 632 642 
Table 2 presents OLS estimates of local precolonial institutions (village head succession rules) with deforestation for 
2000 to 2012, with double-clustered standard errors in the parentheses for the continent of Africa.***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent and 10 per cent level. The base category of chiefs is 
hereditary succession. Political centralization is a binary variable where a value of 0 represents a fragmented society 
and a value of 1 represents a centralized society. Colonial institutions include Colonial Duration, Indirect Rule and 
Colonial Intensity. Current institutions include Rule of Law and Protected Areas. Controls are as follows: Population 
density; Geographic Controls (Vegetation Zones, Distance to sea, Distance from national border, Distance from 
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capital city, Longitude and Latitude, Land suitability for agriculture, Elevation, Malaria stability index); Economic 
Development Controls (Light density); Forest stock controls (forest area in 2000). As our colonial institutional 
measures and rule of law have zero within standard deviation, we are unable to include country fixed effects in 
estimations (1)-(5). For estimation (6), current institutions is limited to Protected Areas only. 
 
While there are large forested regions in Africa (mainly located around the equator but also at the 
very north of the continent; see Figure 3) there are also vast arid regions and large tracts of scrub 
and woodlands.  Given our interest in deforestation, and therefore to focus our analysis on the 
forested regions of Africa, we replicate the above estimations solely on those areas where forests 
predominate and results are shown in Table 3.  We consider this targeted analysis to be superior 
and less prone to measurement error, although it does come with a cost of a reduced number of 
observations (falling from 642 for the whole of the continent to 273 when just including forests).   
Compared to the base case of hereditary succession, the coefficient for precolonial regions where 
village heads were appointed through social standing is positive and highly significant across 
most specifications (see Table 3).  As can be seen from Column 1, the coefficient is positive with 
a value of 0.815.  The coefficient for precolonial regions where village heads were appointed 
from above is negative and significant, with a value of -0.832 in the absence of any controls.  
However, when the controls are added (Columns 2 to 6) the coefficient falls in value 
considerably while the standard errors increase.  As a result this measure loses its statistical 
significance.  Once more, the coefficient for the degree of precolonial political centralization is 
statistically insignificant across all specifications.       
In the most comprehensive specification, that includes country fixed effects and all controls at 
the precolonial level (Column 6), the coefficient for local leaders appointed by social standing is 
0.789 and significant at the 5 per cent level.  This suggests that the regions where local leaders 
were appointed by social standing in precolonial times have approximately 0.8 percent points 
more deforestation (compared to the base case of hereditary succession) over the period 2000 to 
2012.  Given the magnitude of this coefficient compared to the mean deforestation for forested 
regions for the same period (approximately 1.6 per cent), the statistical relationship is not only 
significant, but also of large magnitude.  The coefficients of the other mode of appointment 
(democratic succession) are consistently positively signed but only statistically significant at the 
10 per cent level (under our preferred specification in Column 6) with a coefficient of 0.535. In 
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summary, precolonial succession rules of local village heads are shown to have a significant 
relationship (both in terms of statistical significance and magnitude) with measures of 
deforestation in Africa over the period of 2000 to 2012. 
Table 3: Precolonial institutions and deforestation in designated forests 
       
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Local precolonial institutions       
Democratic election 0.623 0.626 0.610 0.559* 0.556 0.535* 
 (0.466) (0.386) (0.385) (0.330) (0.342) (0.306) 
Election from above -0.832*** 0.153 0.151 0.108 0.134 -0.465 
 (0.301) (0.301) (0.341) (0.394) (0.400) (0.413) 
Election by social standing 0.815* 0.919*** 0.916*** 0.903** 0.853** 0.789** 
 (0.430) (0.327) (0.328) (0.357) (0.357) (0.372) 
 
Political centralization 
   
0.001 
 
0.057 
 
0.096 
 
0.152 
   (0.245) (0.226) (0.211) (0.262) 
       
R^2 0.027 0.300 0.302 0.335 0.338 0.497 
Colonial institutions No No No Yes Yes No 
Current institutions No No No No Yes Yes 
Population density No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Geographic controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Economic development controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Forest stock control No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects No No No No No Yes 
Observations 273 273 273 273 273 273 
Table 3 presents OLS estimates of local precolonial institutions (village head succession rules) with deforestation for 
2000 to 2012, with double-clustered standard errors in the parentheses for the continent of Africa.***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent and 10 per cent level. The base category of chiefs is 
hereditary succession. Political centralization is a binary variable where a value of 0 represents a fragmented society 
and a value of 1 represents a centralized society. Colonial institutions include Colonial Duration, Indirect Rule and 
Colonial Intensity. Current institutions include Rule of Law and Protected Areas. Controls are as follows: Population 
density; Geographic Controls (Vegetation Zones, Distance to sea, Distance from national border, Distance from 
capital city, Longitude and Latitude, Land suitability for agriculture, Elevation, Malaria stability index); Economic 
Development Controls (Light density); Forest stock controls (forest area in 2000). As our colonial institutional 
measures and rule of law have zero within standard deviation, we are unable to include country fixed effects in 
estimations (1)-(5). For estimation (6), current institutions is limited to Protected Areas only. 
 
 
4.1 Robustness tests 
While the results above demonstrate a strong statistical relationship with local precolonial 
institutions and current levels of deforestation, it is acknowledged that the Hansen et al. (2013) 
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measure for deforestation (forest loss) may not be beyond criticism and that the start and end 
dates (2000-2012) are somewhat arbitrary.  Therefore, as a test for robustness of these results we 
also ran the equations using a measure of deforestation that we generated using tree cover data 
available for the period 2003 to 2008. 
We derived this variable by reclassifying percent tree cover data (ISCGM 2013) into forest and 
non-forest, using a threshold of at least 30 per cent of tree cover for a pixel to be considered 
forest (Couturier et al. 2012; Bodart et al. 2013; Mayaux et al. 2013). We used this binary 
classification of forest cover to calculate the fraction of forested area in each precolonial society 
for the years 2003 and 2008 and then calculated the difference between both values for each 
precolonial society. Tree cover data in raster format were obtained from ISCGM (2013) who 
derived them from MODIS images. The tree cover rasters have a resolution of 30 and 15 arc-
seconds for each year respectively (500m and 1km approximately) and each pixel represents the 
percentage of canopy cover in a range from 0 to 100 per cent.  Mean deforestation of this 
measure for the continent as a whole is 1.694 per cent, which is approximately a third higher 
than the Hansen et. al. (2013) data and has a much higher variance (with a standard deviation of 
23.796 per cent and with a maximum of 74.38 per cent deforestation and 71.61 per cent of forest 
increase.  
The results of the equations above using the alternative measure for deforestation with a 
shortened timeframe are presented in Tables 4 and 5 below.  Table 4 presents the regression 
results for the whole continent while Table 5 presents the results only for those regions where 
forests predominate. The results are reassuringly similar in terms of precolonial institutions.  We 
find that compared to the base case of hereditary rule, areas where village heads were appointed 
by social standing are consistently positive and statistically significant.  However, it should be 
noted that the absolute magnitudes are considerably higher than those estimated using the 
Hansen et. al. (2013) data; 7.500 for the continent as a whole and 8.226 for forested regions, but 
so are the standard errors.  These higher magnitudes should be taken with some caution and can 
be partly explained by the much higher degree of variance in deforestation rates contained in this 
alternative data set.  Most importantly, these results generated from an alternative data source 
confirm the strong statistical relationship between local precolonial institutions and recent 
deforestation.        
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Table 4: Precolonial institutions and deforestation in Africa: alternative data for 
deforestation 
       
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Local precolonial institutions       
Democratic election 1.141 1.602 1.819 1.653 1.468 -0.431 
 (4.249) (2.579) (2.525) (2.437) (2.478) (1.878) 
Election from above -3.380 2.157 3.421 2.528 2.319 -0.323 
 (5.01) (3.959) (3.864) (3.802) (3.998) (2.310) 
Election by social standing 12.253** 13.009*** 12.459*** 11.563** 11.591*** 7.500** 
 (5.700) (4.037) (4.070) (4.492) (4.353) (3.523) 
 
Political centralization 
   
-2.810 
 
-2.509 
 
-2.594 
 
-2.022 
   (2.110) (1.996) (1.869) (1.318) 
       
R^2 0.012 0.458 0.460 0.494 0.512 0.689 
Colonial institutions No No No Yes Yes No 
Current institutions No No No No Yes Yes 
Population density No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Geographic controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Economic development controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Forest stock control No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects No No No No No Yes 
Observations 645 645 645 632 632 642 
Table 4 presents OLS estimates of local precolonial institutions (village head succession rules) with an alternative 
measure of deforestation for 2003 to 2008, with double-clustered standard errors in the parentheses for the whole of 
Africa.  ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent and 10 per cent level. The base 
category of chiefs is hereditary succession. Political centralization is a binary variable where a value of 0 represents 
a fragmented society and a value of 1 represents a centralized society. Colonial institutions include Colonial 
Duration, Indirect Rule and Colonial Intensity. Current institutions include Rule of Law and Protected Areas. 
Controls are as follows: Population density; Geographic Controls (Vegetation Zones, Distance to sea, Distance from 
national border, Distance from capital city, Longitude and Latitude, Land suitability for agriculture, Elevation, 
Malaria stability index); Economic Development Controls (Light density); Forest stock controls (forest area in 
2003). As our colonial institutional measures and rule of law have zero within standard deviation, we are unable to 
include country fixed effects in estimations (1)-(5). For estimation (6), current institutions is limited to Protected 
Areas only. 
 
Table 5: Precolonial institutions and deforestation in designated forests: alternative data 
for deforestation 
       
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Local precolonial institutions       
Democratic election 5.214 5.773 5.300 3.416 3.319 3.472 
 (5.539) (4.805) (4.788) (4.287) (4.478) (3.935) 
Election from above 1.400 -0.424 -0.387 -3.017 -3.136 -2.844 
 (14.694) (8.314) (8.186) (6.809) (6.551) (8.611) 
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Election by social standing 17.429** 12.968** 12.774** 10.236** 9.611** 8.226* 
 (8.740) (5.331) (5.249) (4.541) (4.732) (4.805) 
 
Political centralization 
   
-0.260 
 
0.675 
 
0.537 
 
1.970 
   (2.748) (2.349) (2.652) (2.581) 
       
R^2 0.021 0.477 0.482 0.524 0.529 0.678 
Colonial institutions No No No Yes Yes No 
Current institutions No No No No Yes Yes 
Population density No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Geographic controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Economic development controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Forest stock control No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects No No No No No Yes 
Observations 272 272 272 272 272 272 
Table 5 presents OLS estimates of local precolonial institutions (village head succession rules) with an alternative 
measure of deforestation for 2003 to 2008, with double-clustered standard errors in the parentheses for the whole of 
Africa.  ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent and 10 per cent level. The base 
category of chiefs is hereditary succession. Political centralization is a binary variable where a value of 0 represents 
a fragmented society and a value of 1 represents a centralized society. Colonial institutions include Colonial 
Duration, Indirect Rule and Colonial Intensity. Current institutions include Rule of Law and Protected Areas. 
Controls are as follows: Population density; Geographic Controls (Vegetation Zones, Distance to sea, Distance from 
national border, Distance from capital city, Longitude and Latitude, Land suitability for agriculture, Elevation, 
Malaria stability index); Economic Development Controls (Light density); Forest stock controls (forest area in 
2003). As our colonial institutional measures and rule of law have zero within standard deviation, we are unable to 
include country fixed effects in estimations (1)-(5). For estimation (6), current institutions is limited to Protected 
Areas only. 
5. Discussion 
Our results provide striking evidence of an enduring relationship between precolonial institutions 
and current rates of deforestation in Africa. They suggest that village heads still continue to 
control access to natural resources in Africa, and that the institutions that govern their tenure 
have an important impact on environmental outcomes. We find that local village head succession 
rules have a strong statistical relationship with current rates of deforestation.  In particular, we 
find near consistent results that those areas where village heads (or chiefs) were known to be 
appointed by ‘social standing’ have higher current rates of deforestation compared to the base 
case of hereditary succession.  We also find some evidence that those societies where local 
village heads were appointed from above (normally by a paramount chief) have lower current 
rates of deforestation.  Finally, the results also show that democratic succession is associated 
with higher levels of deforestation compared to the base case of hereditary rule.   
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It must be stressed that these findings are generated while controlling for a multitude of variables 
that are known to be, or are likely to be, associated with deforestation.  These include the 
existing forest stock (the percent of forest cover in each precolonial region in 2000) and therefore 
controlling for the relative scarcity or abundance of forest resources in each of the local 
communities; and per cent of protected areas in each precolonial region. These are in addition to 
various other known and potential drivers of deforestation that include: type of vegetation, 
population density, distance to markets, longitude and latitude, suitability of land to agriculture, 
elevation (that is known to be correlated with ethnic fractionalization, see Michalopoulos 2012), 
malaria suitability, and light density at night (which is an established proxy for economic 
development, see Michalopoulos and Papaioannou 2013, 2014).  Finally, we also control for 
current and colonial institutions (rule of law index and the type and intensity of colonial rule) and 
country fixed effects (which enable us to account for all country specific, time invariant factors). 
Our results are consistent with a number of recent works that find a statistical link between 
precolonial institutions to current measures of institutional quality.  Many of these works 
highlight the fact that, especially in rural areas, many African states have a limited reach and 
therefore local institutions (which are often non-state) play an important role in public good 
provision.  While most of these works have focused on the degree of political centralization 
found among precolonial societies, Guiliano and Nunn (2013) also focused on local precolonial 
institutions.  In their case they found a positive link between democratic succession at the village 
level and democratic institutions at the national level.  Where this paper differs from the current 
literature that links precolonial institutions and current measures of institutional quality is that it 
concerns natural resource management, namely deforestation.  Therefore, the remainder of this 
discussion section contextualizes the results and provides guidance for policy makers. 
The concept of legal pluralism suggests that state and non-state regulators can coexist in the 
same regulatory space, and our results suggest this is the case in the governance of forests.  In 
this sense, our results in no way imply that state institutions are irrelevant.  Indeed, while not 
reported (in order to focus the analysis on precolonial institutions) the coefficient for the 
percentage of protected areas in each precolonial region is negative and highly significant 
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(suggesting that protected areas are associated with a reduction in deforestation).
5
  More 
generally, the seminal works of Acemoglu et al. (2000, 2002) and La Porta et al. (2001) and the 
literature that these works have generated has highlighted the importance, across a wide range of 
measures of institutional efficiency, of Africa’s state institutions and their colonial legacy.  
Rather, our results suggest that any comprehensive analysis of institutional outcomes in rural 
Africa, especially those concerning natural resource management where local non-state 
leadership is known to continue to play an important role, must adequately consider and measure 
both state and non-state institutions.  In terms of natural resource management, our results are 
consistent with the broad findings of Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan (2001: 11) who conclude that 
‘[t]he state is one important legitimating institution, but it is not the only one, and in many cases 
it may not be as relevant as a village, an ethnic group or a users’ group.’  As outlined in the 
introduction, the institutional literature relating to forest management in Africa suggests that 
traditional leadership structures persist and continue to play an important role.  In a practical 
sense this can see village heads call upon their traditional control rights in relation to the use and 
rationing of forest resources.   
In Africa, the most common form of interaction between state and non-state institutions is one 
where the state recognizes and aims to incorporate traditional authority figures into its own 
system in return for subordination, or indirect rule (Mandami 1996).  By subordinating 
themselves to the state, traditional leaders can gain legitimacy, protection and access to the 
state’s resources (including force).  While indirect rule was a common colonial practice, it 
continues well into the post-colonial era and the vast majority of African states have enshrined 
traditional leadership structures into their constitutions and legal systems (see Herbst 2000). 
Indirect rule has enabled many precolonial institutions survive and even grow in strength, both in 
the colonial and precolonial era (Mandami 1996, Acemoglu et al. 2014).  Given the limited 
capacity of the state in many parts of rural Africa and that significant numbers of people living 
within or on the borders of state protected forests, cooperation with, or direct enforcement of, 
state protections by traditional leadership is often an important element of forest protection 
                                                 
5
Consistent with our results Green et al. (2013) have found state parks in Africa to be (partially) effective reducing 
forest loss.  More generally, while the literature on protected areas is contentious, not least due to issues of selection 
bias and endogeneity, they do seem to be at least partially effective in forest protection (see Pfaff et al .2014, Joppa 
and Pfaff 2010 and Campbell et al. 2008). In relation to state versus non-state protections, Hays (2006) and Bray et 
al. (2008), have shown that forests protected by informal rules and non-state grouping (e.g. community forests) 
achieve similar outcomes as forests protected by state legislation (e.g. national parks).   
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policy (see Adams and Hulme 2001 and Fabricius et al. 2013).   With the practice of indirect rule 
and the limited capacity of the state more generally, local leaders are often left unobserved by 
central authorities.  These results provide important guidance for those concerned with forest 
conservation toward local institutions (whether they be officially recognized by the state or not) 
where local leaders are appointed by social status as, all things being equal, they are 
experiencing much faster deforestation than other areas.      
In terms of succession rules being a proxy for institutional checks and balances on local leaders, 
our empirical results are consistent with this interpretation.  Those areas where chiefs were 
known to be appointed by ‘social standing’ are associated with higher levels of deforestation.  
These are institutions that we have hypothesized to be the most susceptible to corrupt and 
patrimonial practices, and that could see resource rents used for personal benefit or selectively 
distributed in exchange for support.  Indeed, engaging in deforestation (or allowing it for 
payment) is one possible source of rent that can be used to generate or maintain local level 
political support.  We also find some evidence that those areas where village heads were 
appointed from above are associated with lower levels of deforestation.  Again, these results are 
consistent with our institutional analysis that leaders with more institutional checks over their 
control of local public goods should be associated with forest conservation.  In terms of 
democratic succession, our results suggest that any beneficial effects generated from strictures of 
democratic governance are outweighed by the tendency for democratically elected chiefs to 
engage in patrimonial behaviour or that that there is a preference among local communities to 
trade-off short term consumption for long-term welfare (which is being operationalized by the 
local leadership).  Our results are also in-line with the other potential transmission mechanism 
identified; the degree to which leaders with less concrete authority generate conflict and 
uncertainty over property rights, which in turn devalues them and makes co-ordination against 
outsiders wishing to exploit them more difficult.  However, little further can be said on whether 
this mechanism is more or less relevant because the rankings in terms of their effects of 
deforestation are virtually equivalent to the institutional checks and balances mechanism. 
Therefore, gaining a better understanding of these more complex channels of influence (and of 
the interactions of different sets of institutional frameworks) would seem to be the next step in 
understanding the role that legal pluralism plays in relation to deforestation in Africa.  
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6. Conclusion 
There is a growing awareness that precolonial institutions continue to impact current measures of 
institutional efficiency in Africa and the developing world.  This is the first investigation that we 
are aware of that links precolonial institutions with deforestation.  We find that areas where local 
leaders were appointed through ‘social standing’ in precolonial times are associated with higher 
current levels of deforestation.  While these results are new to the literature, they should not be 
entirely unexpected.  Local leaders in Africa are often still vested with resource control rights 
that can directly affect forest management and the rate of deforestation. In such an institutional 
context, we can expect non-state resource controllers with fewer institutional checks to be more 
prone to engage in self-interested rent extraction policies, which can lead to higher rates of 
deforestation.  We can also expect more ownership disputes in areas where the legitimacy of 
local leaders is weaker and requires patrimonial largesse. 
Deforestation continues to be a major source of greenhouse gas emissions, biodiversity loss and 
habitat destruction in Africa, despite concerted efforts from the international community, 
national governments and the Green Belt movement to halt it.  While these efforts should be 
continued, these findings suggest that local institutions (some of them which may not be easily 
observable by national governments or the casual observer) play an important role in 
deforestation.  Gaining a better understanding of the channels of influence between the legacy of 
precolonial institutions and forest management (and the interactions of different sets of 
institutional frameworks) is the next step in understanding the role that institutions play in 
relation to understanding and reducing deforestation in Africa, and the developing world more 
generally.  Indeed, acknowledging the specific influence of local institutions on forest 
conservation, as produced by historical institutional pathways and legal pluralism more generally, 
could be the missing link in finally halting large scale deforestation in Africa. 
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APPENDIX 
Variable Description Level of 
Aggregation 
Source 
Measure of 
deforestation 
(g_net) 
The percentage of the precolonial society area that 
underwent net forest loss between 2000-2012. Net 
forest loss is the difference between loss and gain of 
forest cover. 
Precolonial society Hansen et al. (2013) 
Forest area in 
2000  
(g_treecov_200
0) 
The mean tree cover in 2000 within the boundaries 
of each precolonial society, measured in the range 0-
100. 
Precolonial society Hansen et al. (2013) 
Forest area in 
2003 
(tc_forest2003) 
The percentage of forested land in 2003 within the 
boundaries of each precolonial society. Forested land 
is defined as land where the tree cover is at least 30 
per cent. 
Precolonial society Calculated using raster 
data based on MODIS 
images for the year 
2003; Available from 
http://www.iscgm.org/ 
Forest area in 
2008 
(tc_forest2008) 
The percentage of forested land in 2008 within the 
boundaries of each precolonial society. Forested land 
is defined as land where the tree cover is at least 30 
per cent. 
Precolonial society Calculated using raster 
data based on MODIS 
images for the year 
2008; Available from 
http://www.iscgm.org/ 
Alternative 
measure for 
Deforestation 
(tc_forestdiff) 
The fractional change in forested land within the 
boundaries of each precolonial society between 2003 
and 2008.  
Precolonial society Calculated using raster 
data based on MODIS 
images for the years 
2003 and 2008; 
Available from 
http://www.iscgm.org/ 
Rule of law A composite variable that captures perceptions of the 
extent to which agents have confidence in and abide 
by the rules of society, and in particular the quality 
of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, 
and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and 
violence. 
Country Available at 
http://info.worldbank.or
g/governance/wgi/inde
x.aspx 
Protected areas The percentage of the precolonial society area which 
was declared as protected on or prior to 2003.  
Precolonial society Available from 
www.protectedplanet.n
et and 
http://ramsar.wetlands.
org/ 
Colonial 
Duration 
The duration of colonization in years. Country Ziltener and Kuenzler 
(2013) 
Indirect Control A measure of different levels of political domination, 
where 0 represents direct control and 1 represents 
indirect control. 
Country Based on Ziltener and 
Kuenzler (2013) 
Colonial 
Intensity 
A measure of the intensity of colonization. 
Calculated as the sum of the logarithms of colonial 
duration and indirect control. 
Country Calculated using data 
from Ziltener and 
Kuenzler (2013).  
Legal origin A binary variable where a value of 0 represents Country Available from 
37 
British legal origin and a value of 1 represents 
French legal origin. 
http://scholar.harvard.e
du/shleifer/publications
?page=2 
Political 
centralization 
A binary variable where a value of 0 represents a 
fragmented society and a value of 1 represents a 
centralized society 
Precolonial society (Gennaioli and Rainer 
2007) 
Succession of 
chiefs 
A categorical variable where a value of 0 represents 
a precolonial society where succession of chiefs is 
hereditary; a value of 1 represents democratic 
election; a value of 2 represents election from above; 
and a value of 3 represents election by social 
standing. 
Precolonial society Murdoch (1967) 
available from 
http://eclectic.ss.uci.edu
/~drwhite/worldcul/Eth
nographicAtlasWCRevi
sedByWorld 
Cultures.sav 
Population 
density 
Population density per square kilometer in 2000 
(log). 
Precolonial society Available from 
http://na.unep.net/sioux
falls/datasets/datalist.ph
p 
Distance from 
closest sea 
The geodesic distance (in 1,000km) from the 
centroid of each precolonial society to the nearest 
coastline. 
Precolonial society Available from 
http://www.gmi.org  
Distance from 
national border 
The geodesic distance (in 1,000km) from the 
centroid of each precolonial society to the nearest 
border. 
Precolonial society Michalopoulos and 
Papaioannou (2013) 
Distance from 
capital city 
The geodesic distance (in 1,000 km) from the 
centroid of each precolonial society to the capital 
city of the current country . 
Precolonial society Michalopoulos and 
Papaioannou (2013) 
Latitude The geographical latitude of a precolonial state. Precolonial society Michalopoulos and 
Papaioannou (2013) 
Longitude The geographical longitude of a precolonial state. Precolonial society Michalopoulos and 
Papaioannou (2013) 
Land suitability 
for agriculture 
The average value of an index consisting of the 
climatic and soil suitability for agriculture.  
Precolonial society Available from 
http://www.sage.wisc.e
du/iamdata/grid_data_s
el.php 
Elevation Average elevation (in kilometres). Precolonial society Available from 
http://www.sage.wisc.e
du/atlas/data.php?incda
taset=Topography 
Malaria stability 
index 
The average value of an index taking into account 
types of mosquiotoes  indigenous to a region and 
their prevalence. 
Precolonial society Kiszewski et al. (2004) 
Light density The average luminosity across pixels in 2007 and 
2008 (log). 
Precolonial society Available from 
http://www.ngdc.noaa.g
ov/dmsp/downloadV4c
omposites.html 
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Table S2: Partial correlation of control variables  
Variable Partial correlation 
Population density (log) -0.128 
Distance from closest sea 0.092 
Distance from national border -0.039 
Distance from capital city -0.075 
Latitude  0.123 
Longitude 0.118 
Land suitability for agriculture -0.039 
Elevation 0.053 
Malaria stability index -0.058 
Light density (log) 0.062 
Protected areas -0.014 
Forest area in 2000 -0.312 
 
 
Table S3: Correlation matrix of key variables 
 Deforestation 
(g_net) 
Light density 
(log) 
Protected 
areas 
Forest area in 
2000 
Deforestation (g_net) 1.000    
Light density (log) 0.010 1.000   
Protected areas -0.049 -0.014 1.000  
Forest area in 2000 -0.409 -0.138 0.092 1.000 
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Table S4: Summary statistics of control variables 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Population density (log) 683 2.899 2.022 -4.605 7.432 
Distance from closest sea 683 0.589 0.421 0.001 1.704 
Distance from national border 683 0.102 0.111 0.001 0.617 
Distance from capital city 683 0.504 0.387 0.011 1.882 
Latitude 683 4.537 12.066 -32 37 
Longitude  683 16.347 16.638 -32 48 
Land suitability for agriculture 683 0.435 0.241 0.001 0.979 
Elevation 683 0.634 0.467 0 2.181 
Malaria stability index 683 0.724 0.329 0 1 
Light density (log) 683 -2.946 1.701 -4.605 3.225 
Forest area in 2000 683 25.312 26.430 0 99.229 
Forest area in 2003 683 37.412 37.404 0 98.58 
 
 
